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Responding to Search Warrants in White Collar Criminal Investigations

Search Warrants: An Introduction

An owner of a corporation operating in a highly regulated industry calls counsel’s office to inform counsel that FBI agents are executing a search warrant at one of the corporation’s facilities and may begin gathering employees in a room for interviews. The corporation and its employees have no experience with responding to or managing search warrants. The owner is present at the facility subject to the search and wants to retain counsel to come to the facility and manage the search. How should counsel respond to the phone call and what steps should counsel take to minimize the impact of the search?

Preliminary Steps

During the initial exchange with the client, counsel should confirm how many agents are present at the site, whether agents are particularly interested in specific areas or divisions of the facility, and whether the agents requested that certain employees consent to interviews. After obtaining this information, counsel might take the following preliminary steps to reasonably assure that the corporation’s interests remain protected and that employees on site understand their individual roles, where applicable, during the execution of the search warrant.

Obtain and review the search warrant and request a copy of the search warrant affidavit. Because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(d) entitles the subject of a search to obtain a complete copy of the search warrant, counsel should advise the client to request a copy of the search warrant to understand the precise scope and nature of the search, the agency conducting the search, and the magistrate to whom the search warrant must be returned. Defects in the warrant should also be identified immediately by reviewing the warrant, including whether the warrant is overly broad with respect to the places to be searched, whether the warrant is stale, or whether the warrant fails to describe with adequate particularity the property to be seized. There is disagreement among district courts, however, as to exactly when the officer is required to provide the corporation with a copy of the warrant, the receipt of the property seized, or the affidavit supporting probable cause.

The Supreme Court has also noted, in dicta, that neither the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Fourth Amendment imposes a requirement upon the officer executing the search to present the property owner with a copy of the warrant before conducting the search.

This seemingly adverse precedent does not necessarily mean that executing officers will not furnish a copy of the warrant to the corporation before the search as a matter of best practices to avoid future litigation, including evidentiary hearings in connection with motions to suppress or emergency motions for return of property pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), nor does it mean that an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) would not be receptive to such requests. Thus, counsel should instruct the corporation to obtain the warrant and a copy of the probable cause affidavit at the earliest possible time although, generally, courts require the filing of a motion to unseal the search warrant affidavit in order to obtain that affidavit.7

Identify the agents on site and contact the agent in charge or the AUSA. A representative of the corporation, or contact person, should obtain the names of the agents on site, including the agent in charge (AIC), and request the name of the individual AUSA responsible for supervising the ongoing investigation. After someone obtains that information, counsel should contact the AIC, and whenever possible, the AUSA, to inform both of them that counsel represents the corporation. Establishing a rapport with the AUSA is critical since she may provide valuable information with respect to the direction of the ongoing investigation. It will also be in the corporation’s best interests to maintain an amicable relationship with the AUSA if the corporation decides to voluntary disclose violations and cooperate with the government.

Communicate ground rules for the search to employees. The client should also assign a representative of the corporation to communicate the following information to employees: (1) the agents are on the premises to conduct a search; (2) the corporation does not know if any of the employees are targets of the search or an ongoing investigation; (3) employees should not engage in any obstructive conduct or alter, delete, or remove any records, equipment, or electronically stored information (ESI) on site; (4) agents may try to interview employees, but the employees are not required to speak to the agents;9 and (5) employees should not create or sign any documents on behalf of the corporation without first conferring with their appropriate supervisor.

Designate note-takers and begin conducting an internal accounting of the items seized. The corporation should also designate at least one employee to take notes while the search is underway. Note-taking accomplishes significant objectives for the corporation. First, employee observations contained in notes may provide the legal basis for challenging either the government’s seizure of corporate property or the legality of the search. Second, notes may provide the corporation with valuable information about the scope and direction of the government’s case and, potentially, the government’s sources of information. Third, note-taking is especially important in the scenario described above in which the corporation does not have a copy of the search warrant prior to its execution.

There is a fundamental difference, however, between taking notes, as observers of the search, and unnecessarily stalking the agents, eavesdropping on conversations between or among agents, or engaging in conduct that may be reasonably viewed as interfering with the search. Bearing this in mind, as observers of the search, each note-taker should pay attention to where the agents commenced the search, how the search progressed, what locations of the facility were the subject of the search, and whether the agents appeared particularly interested in a specific item of property.

Whenever possible, each note-taker should also take note of any of the agents’ questions with respect to the location of a specific item of property. In addition, since the attorney-client privilege attaches to “information gathered by corporate employees for transmission to corporate counsel for the rendering of legal advice,” each note-taker should address his note — containing his observations during the search — to counsel in order to put those communications under the cloak of the attorney-client privilege.10 Finally, the corporation should assign additional employees at the facility to conduct an internal accounting of what the agents seized from the corporation. An internal accounting is a significant step that will preserve the corporation’s ability to later challenge any discrepancies between its internal accounting and the inventory return produced by the government.

Avoid Common Missteps

There are several common missteps the corporation should avoid during the search. As set forth below, employees of the corporation should not engage in obstructive conduct nor should they supply the government with any additional legal authority to search the facility by either signing a consent to search form or verbally consenting to a search of the facility. Moreover, employees on site should take reasonable measures to identify and safeguard privileged documents, including potentially privileged documents, and documents containing confidential or proprietary information.

Avoid obstructive conduct. Employees should understand that they should refrain from impeding or obstructing the search and should not tamper with, alter, or destroy any documents, equipment, or ESI. Any of those acts may be considered obstruction of justice pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1519 or another federal obstruction of justice statute.12

Do not consent to search the facility. Agents will frequently attempt to obtain written or verbal consent to search the business premises even if they have a search warrant. This is a significant event because voluntary and knowing consent provides the government with an additional, legal basis for executing the search in the event that the corporation challenges the search warrant based on a defect in the warrant or deficiencies in the probable cause affidavit.13 To this end, employees should be instructed that they should not sign a consent to search form or permit agents to obtain verbal consent to search the facility. Employees also should not consent to a search of an area of the facility that is outside the scope of the particular places to be searched included in the search warrant. A search warrant should be narrowly tailored for its specific purpose; it should not provide the government with free reign to conduct a fishing expedition that auspiciously unearths evidence of a criminal violation.14 Importantly, the corporation may also retract its consent when it mistakenly consents to a search of a segment of the facility that exceeds the scope of the search warrant.15 The sudden retraction may annoy the agents on the scene. Agents may even threaten a noncompliant employee with an obstruction charge or inform the employee that if he does not consent to the search of the area outside the search warrant, they will obtain a warrant that covers that area.16 Putting the agent’s sentiments aside, even if an item is not within the scope of the warrant, employees should not act in such a way that they are perceived as undercutting the agents or object to the search in any way that could be viewed as interference. Instead, they should relay any questions with respect to the scope of the search warrant to counsel (either in person or through a contact person on site) in order for counsel to adequately provide advice to the corporation with respect to the search. And, even in close cases, counsel might advise the corporation to retract consent to preserve the objection to the search and require the agents to obtain an additional warrant.

Protect any privileged documents located at the facility. A determination of whether privileged or potentially privileged documents are located at the facility should be made. Documents identified as privileged or potentially privileged should then be sealed, a privilege log should be created, and the sealed documents and the privilege log should then be delivered to a magistrate judge or special master to resolve any government objections to the corporation’s privilege determinations.17 In the rare circumstance in which the agents begin seizing documents the corporation has identified as privileged or potentially privileged documents, counsel should consider filing an emergency Rule 41(g) motion with the magistrate judge.18Rule 41(g) is concerned with those whose property or privacy interests are impaired by the seizure and plainly permits anyone aggrieved by the deprivation of property to seek its return. An unlawful search or seizure is not a precondition to a Rule 41(g) motion.19 It is important to note, however, that courts may be reluctant to intervene in this process for several reasons. First, on balance, the corporation’s interest in reviewing the potentially privileged materials may be substantially outweighed by the government’s interest in seizing the materials as long as the government properly employs a “taint team.”20 Second, a magistrate judge may not want to second-guess law enforcement judgments. Third, reviewing voluminous amounts of documents is overly burdensome to the magistrate judge. Fourth, some magistrate judges may admonish the parties for failing to resolve these issues, independently, as professionals. Furthermore, in response to the filing of the Rule 41 motion, there is always a risk that the magistrate judge may issue an order determining that the communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.

Send nonessential employees home. Essential employees who may be able to assist the agents in locating documents or items specified in the search warrant should remain on site at the facility, whereas employees who are not essential should be informed that they are free to go home for the remainder of the day. By notifying nonessential employees who are not in “custody” that they are free to go home, the corporation has not engaged in any inherently obstructive conduct.21 A cursory review of the applicable obstruction statute illustrates this point.22 In fact, the argument that counsel herself has somehow obstructed the agent’s investigation in this scenario rests on shaky grounds.23 One way to distinguish between essential and nonessential employees might be to determine what segment of the business is subject to the search and identify the employees who are working in that area.

Drawing this important distinction may also provide several additional benefits to the corporation. First, it may accelerate the search because employees with the requisite knowledge will be able to redirect the agents to the location of items described in the search warrant. Second, it might minimize the amount of materials seized and will, at the very least, reduce the disruptive effect of the search. After all, the corporation has interests beyond the search, including its reputation and maintaining goodwill with its employees and its contractual partners, and counsel must be mindful of those interests. Third, by reducing the number of employees onsite, employees are less likely to make spontaneous statements to the agents that may potentially harm the corporation. Moreover, they are less likely to consent to a search of any places or of any items or materials not specifically included in the search warrant, which may prolong the search or require additional litigation.

Employee Interviews

Counsel’s strategy with respect to employee interviews should be informed by five substantial considerations: counsel’s duty to the corporation, counsel’s duty of loyalty, concerns related to communicating with individual employees at the site, obstruction of justice concerns, and practical considerations.

Duty to the corporation. As counsel for the corporation, counsel has a duty to represent and protect the vital interests of the corporation, including its potential exposure to civil or criminal liability.24 During a search, because employees may be untrained, nervous, unprepared, or a combination thereof, employees are not likely to understand that they may decline agent interviews. This fundamental misunderstanding undeniably has the potential to expose the corporation to both civil and criminal liability because certain employee statements, including potentially incriminating statements, may be imputed to the corporation as nonhearsay statements of an opposing party.25 To make matters worse, even though an employee interview conducted during a search is an inherently coercive situation in which the employee, objectively, may not feel free to leave, courts have held that employees are not in “custody” during these interviews, and therefore, employees have no cognizable Fifth Amendment rights during these interviews.26 Further, even if employees were cloaked with the protections of the Fifth Amendment, the corporation only has standing to challenge the legality of the search and any statements, including employee statements, obtained during an unlawful search as fruits of the poisonous tree.27 Yet even that doctrine is far from absolute.28 A court may deny a motion to suppress the statements if the court finds that the taint from the unlawful search had dissipated at the time that the statements were obtained.29 Given this venerable jurisprudence, it is incumbent upon counsel for the corporation to fashion appropriate strategies to protect the corporation’s interests. As discussed in greater detail below, one way to protect the corporation’s interests and to avoid either obstructing an ongoing investigation or providing advice to employees is to propose reasonable guidelines governing how, when, and where such employee interviews might be conducted. After all, both the government and the corporation should be interested in taking reasonable steps to minimize the risk that employee statements are obtained by agents through coercion, cajoling, or intimidation during the execution of a search warrant. The employee should know that he may decline an interview and obtain counsel.30

Duty of loyalty. Because loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client’s informed consent,31counsel should not attempt to represent or imply that he represents an employee whose interests are adverse to the interests of the corporation. For example, there may be a reason to believe that an employee is a whistleblower or the employee is a potential government witness armed with incriminating information about the corporation’s business activities.32

Concerns related to communication with individual employees. Counsel’s communication with individual employees raises two principal concerns. A primary concern is that, by communicating with an employee or by responding to an inquisitive employee’s questions about agent interviews, counsel for the corporation might inadvertently form an attorney-client relationship33 with the employee and, in so doing, might place himself in the awkward and undesirable position of having to rebut a claim that counsel simultaneously represents the employee and the corporation. In fact, even if an attorneyclient relationship is never formed, counsel’s law firm may still be required to respond to an unsettling (and humiliating) motion to disqualify.34 Another significant, related concern is that by communicating with an individual employee about an agent interview, counsel may be required to repudiate allegations, regardless of their merit, that counsel has somehow obstructed the government’s investigation.35 Accordingly, to avoid these potential pitfalls, counsel for the corporation should avoid communicating with an employee in any way that may be reasonably construed either as providing legal advice to the employee concerning an agent interview or as improperly influencing an employee’s decision to agree to an interview.

Obstruction of justice concerns. Counsel should not attempt to terminate, impair, or impede the agents’ efforts to interview employees who voluntarily agree to an interview because such interference may be viewed as obstructive conduct. A critical difference exists, however, between informing an employee that he is not required to speak to the agents and instructing or encouraging a particular employee not to agree to an interview with the agents.36

Practical considerations. While employee interviews may be standard procedure during the execution of a search warrant, agents have no ancillary legal authority for conducting such interviews. Instead, the search warrant provides the agents with a legal basis to conduct a search and to seize the particular property named in the search warrant, not to conduct unrestricted employee interviews. Further, attorneys representing the employees may file motions to suppress any statements obtained during employee interviews. For these reasons, counsel for the corporation should communicate to the AUSA that the corporation will assist the agents in locating the items and property named in the search warrant but should also engage in a dialogue with the AUSA to address how, when, and where employee interviews might be conducted. Understanding that it is nearly impossible to predict how a particular AUSA will respond to counsel’s suggestions for conducting employee interviews, counsel should be prepared to present the AUSA with a variety of common-sense options for conducting employee interviews.

  1. Reschedule employee interviews. Counsel might first propose that the AUSA reschedule employee interviews until the employees have an opportunity to evaluate whether they want separate legal counsel to represent them during the interviews. The interviews could be conducted at a location that is convenient to the government, and this option may also permit the AUSA to avoid the necessity of having to issue grand jury subpoenas for each employee.
  2. Delay employee interviews until counsel arrives. Assuming the AUSA is unwilling to reschedule interviews, counsel should then propose that the agents delay employee interviews until counsel arrives at the facility or until local counsel arrives at the facility.
  3. Propose reasonable guidelines for conducting employee interviews. If the AUSA refuses to reschedule or delay employee interviews and counsel cannot locate another qualified attorney within driving distance of the facility to assist with the search, counsel might then propose the following reasonable guidelines37 for conducting employee interviews: (1) permit a representative of the corporation to inform the employees prior to conducting each interview that they are not required to agree to an interview and that, if they agree to an interview, the corporation is willing to pay for an attorney to be present during the interview; (2) provide each employee with a written consent form in the employee’s native language prior to conducting each employee interview to confirm that the employee understands that the employee is free to decline the interview and may have an attorney present during the interview; (3) inform each employee verbally in the employee’s native language prior to conducting each interview that employees are free to decline the interview and to leave the facility and that, should she consent to the interview, she may have an attorney present during the interview; or (4) permit in-house counsel (where applicable) to sit in on the interview of each employee provided that the employee has no objection and provided that the employee understands that counsel represents the corporation, not the employee individually.

In sum, while there are no magic words that will convince an AUSA to agree to implement any of the above-mentioned guidelines for conducting employee interviews, counsel has a duty to protect the corporation’s interests and to recommend reasonable alternatives to conducting the type of involuntary and uninformed interviews that typically transpire during the execution of a search warrant.

AUSA vs. AIC. The possibility always exists that counsel will not be able to identify or contact the AUSA and may wind up negotiating with the AIC with respect to employee interviews. Under these circumstances, counsel should still propose that the AIC reschedule, delay, or implement reasonable guidelines for conducting interviews. Even if the AIC rejects all of counsel’s suggestions for conducting employee interviews, counsel should treat this exchange as an opportunity to set up the cross-examination of the agent during which the agent may be required to explain: (1) why the agents were unwilling or unable to agree to reschedule or delay the interviews; (2) why each interview was “noncustodial”; (3) when and how the agents communicated to the employees that they were “free to leave”; (4) why each interview was voluntary; and (5) why the agents were unwilling or unable to agree to any of counsel’s proposed guidelines for conducting employee interviews, including why the agents were unable or unwilling to communicate to the employees that they may be represented by counsel during the interview.

Final Steps

Prior to the conclusion of the search, the corporation should ensure that it obtains a copy of the receipt of the seized property and requests a copy of the inventory. In addition, when appropriate, the corporation should debrief employees after agents leave the facility.

Obtain a copy of the receipt of the seized property and request a copy of the inventory. The plain language of Rule 41 seems to require that an officer leave a copy of the receipt of the seized property with the corporation before the agents leave the premises.38 Thus, a copy of the receipt should be requested and reviewed to ensure that the list is accurate. If there are any discrepancies between the property listed in the receipt of the seized property and what the search warrant authorized the agents to seize, then these issues must be addressed immediately. In fact, in this scenario, an emergency Rule 41(g) motion before a magistrate judge may be necessary. In addition, a copy of the inventory should be requested prior to the conclusion of the search although the plain language of Rule 41 only requires the magistrate judge — not the officer executing the warrant — upon request to give a copy of the inventory to the person from whom the seized property was taken.39 When such requests are denied, such as when the officers have not completed a copy of the inventory, a request for the copy of the inventory should be made to the magistrate judge as soon as practicable to ensure that the copy is promptly delivered to the corporation.

Debrief employees. After the agents complete the search and leave the facility, employees should be debriefed. The debriefing should focus on determining what materials the agents seized and what segments of the facility were particularly important to the agents. When appropriate, employee interviews should also be conducted to determine what occurred during the search and what may have prompted the search.

Conclusion

As shown, responding to a search in real-time presents uniquely difficult challenges for counsel. A search is a disruptive, unnerving show of force with the potential to shut down a business or cripple its reputation within the community. Armed agents have immediate access to significant documents and essential employees, which the government does not otherwise enjoy when it issues a grand jury subpoena, and there is also no necessity requirement controlling the government’s authority to obtain a search warrant from a magistrate judge.40 Therefore, counsel for the corporation must react quickly, cautiously, and calmly to minimize the potentially devastating consequences of the search. If a corporation has advance notice that it may be subject to a search, such as receiving a grand jury subpoena or determining that it is particularly susceptible to a search because of the industry within which it operates, then employees should be appropriately trained to manage and respond to search warrants.

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Responding to a Civil Investigative Demand

CIDs or Civil Investigative Demands are an increasingly common tool for federal prosecutors in False Claims Act investigations. Indeed, with the sheer volume of qui tam lawsuits filed under seal poses significant administrative and logistical challenges for the government and various U.S. Attorney’s offices. With the uptick in jaded former employee-relators filing impulsive, sometimes parasitic, lawsuits combined with the government’s duty to investigate each and every qui tam lawsuit, deciding which lawsuit is meritorious is challenging and time consuming. Once a complaint is deemed non-frivolous, the government must then further investigate the allegations contained in the sealed complaint to determine if the government should intervene. Time is of the essence though. So, how might the government make an informed decision with respect to intervention given the heightened demand presented by the constant ebb and flow of qui tam complaints? There is no simple answer to this question, yet it is undeniable that, in recent years, the government has stepped up its use of CIDs or Civil Investigative Demands  to investigate possible False Claims Act violations to adequately respond to the spike in whistleblower complaints and to ferret out and punish fraud perpetrated against the government and taxpayers.

This article will focus on how to respond to a civil investigative demand by first analyzing the methods by which the government may request and obtain information through a civil investigative demand. Next, this article will discuss the risks that should inform any strategy for responding to a civil investigative demand and will provide some guidance to practitioners with respect to how clients might counterbalance the sweeping investigative tools employed by the government during this process.

HOW THE GOVERNMENT REQUESTS INFORMATION

The government has the distinct advantage of requesting information in one of three ways because of the broad investigative powers afforded by a civil investigative demand and the government may serve a civil investigative demand on any person in any jurisdiction in the United States and in any foreign country provided that service does not run afoul of due process. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733(c)(1)-(2). Indeed, the government may request information through oral testimony, written interrogatories, or requests for production of documentary materials. In so doing, the government is also under no obligation to announce whether they intend to intervene in the sealed qui tam action nor will they communicate to a recipient of the CID, whether an employee or a corporate entity, whom the defendants are in the sealed complaint. In fact, in the case of an employee recipient, the corporate entity has no legal authority to obtain the CID or to determine whether they might be the subject of the CID.

What the government, however, must tell any recipient of a CID is the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged violation of the False Claims Act which is under investigation and the applicable provision of law alleged to be violated. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733 (a)(2)(A). And, if the CID requests oral testimony from the witness, then the CID must describe the general purpose for which the demand is being issued and the general nature of the testimony, including the “primary areas of inquiry which will be taken pursuant to the demand.” See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733 (a)(2)(D)(v). Stated differently, the government should be prohibited from randomly deviating from the line of questioning set forth in the CID and any attempt to broadly characterize the primary area of inquiry should be met with skepticism.

WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF RESPONDING TO A CID?

Risks abound when deciding whether to respond to a CID. Importantly, a CID may be the prelude to something much more serious, for example, a criminal investigation. In fact, viewed together, Assistant Attorney General Caldwell’s pronouncement last September that the Criminal Division will review every qui tam, and the Holder Memorandum’s strong emphasis on considering investigative strategies that maximize the government’s ability to share information among criminal, civil, and agency administrative teams to the fullest extent permissible by law, should compel practitioners to critically evaluate whether producing documents or providing sworn testimony is in their clients’ best interests.

The above risks are also compounded based on the latitude the government enjoys when it comes to sharing CID materials. Section 3733(i) specifically authorizes any attorney of the Department of Justice, including attorneys who may appear before a grand jury, to receive documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony received by the custodian designated by the government as a consequence of a CID. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733(i)(3) (“Whenever any attorney of the Department of Justice has been designated to appear before any court, grand jury, or federal agency in any case or proceeding, the custodian of any documentary material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony received under this section may deliver such attorney such material, answers, or transcripts for official use in connection with any case or proceeding as such attorney determines to be required..”).

Complicating matters further, a corporate entity or a health care professional, for example, a physician, desiring to challenge the scope of, or set aside, a CID runs the risk of tarnishing his or her reputation because a challenge to a petition has the effect of publicizing the investigation. Indeed, the investigation is nonpublic until a petition to set aside a CID is filed. Thus, petitioners seeking to maintain the secrecy of the investigation may be required to file the petition under seal or move for a protective order in connection with the petition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(e) (“for good cause the court may order in a case…require redaction of additional information..”).

TESTIMONY

Deciding whether to provide oral testimony requires counsel for the CID recipient to examine several key risks.

First, whether a criminal investigation is lurking around the corner or not, sworn testimony is sworn testimony. There are no “do-overs.” A client is stuck with whatever testimony the client has provided. Under these circumstances, even the slightest transgression from the former testimony may be impeachable and harmful concessions are likely admissible in future proceedings. Sometimes even a seemingly innocuous prior inconsistent statement may provide a savvy AUSA with sufficient ammunition for a piercing cross examination. A written transcript of the client’s testimony may also be introduced at a civil trial or a criminal trial even when the declarant (the client) is unavailable or refuses to testify. See Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) (a statement is non hearsay if “the statement is offered against an opposing party and was made by the party in an individual capacity..”). And, as mentioned above, CID materials may be shared with attorneys presiding over a grand jury proceeding.

Second, a client unwilling or reluctant to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth may be subject to a possible false statement or obstruction of justice charge. The government may also compel the client to answer any question to which the client fails to provide an adequate response. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733 (h).

Third, if a client invokes the Fifth Amendment as a ground for refusing to provide oral testimony, the client may be required to robotically invoke the Fifth Amendment on the record each time the government attorney asks a question as a basis for refusing to answer each question. Based on a witness’ continuing invocation of the Fifth Amendment during the oral examination, the government may request an adverse inference instruction although it is debatable if an oral examination pursuant to a Civil Investigative Demand should qualify as a proceeding where an adverse inference instruction is warranted.

In some SEC cases, for example, courts have found that if a witness refuses to testify at an SEC examination, an adverse inference may be drawn from her invocation of the Fifth Amendment. Courts have reached this conclusion even when the witness has a change of heart and decides to testify at a subsequent hearing, proceeding, or trial. See SEC v. Casano, 2000 WL 1512617 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that adverse inference was warranted after defendant’s assertion of Fifth Amendment during an investigative interview even though defendant later testified at a deposition); but see SEC v. Freiberg, 2007 WL 2692041 (D. Utah Sept. 12, 2007)(finding that adverse inference was unwarranted when defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment during an investigative interview because defendant testified at deposition). On the other hand, some courts have also found that deficiencies in a complaint cannot be overcome simply by pointing to a defendant’s assertion of silence. see also “Testify First, Know Why Later: Responding to Civil Investigative Demands for Testimony in False Claims Act Cases,” Karen F. Green and James J. Fauci, Financial Fraud Law Report, pages 301-308 (April 2015) (arguing that no adverse inference should be drawn against a defendant who agrees to testify at a deposition but invokes the Fifth Amendment during oral testimony pursuant to a CID reasoning that, if the defendant later testifies, the government and defendant are equal footing); In Re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 409 F. Supp. 2d 784, 825-26 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (dismissing complaint for fraud because of failure to plead particularity even though defendants asserted Fifth Amendment); In Re Curtis, 177 B.R. 717, 720 (S.D. Ala. 1995) (finding that plaintiff cannot rely on defendant’s assertion of Fifth Amendment to establish elements of fraud)

Thus, counsel for clients faced with the prospect of appearing for oral testimony should consider the above risks.

PRODUCTION

Responding to a request to produce documentary materials similarly obligates counsel to assess various risks and answer some preliminary questions.

First, has the government properly described each class of documentary material to be produced with certainty to allow the client to “fairly identify” such material? See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733(a)(2)(B)(i). Second, assuming the documents are properly identified, are there any reasons, short of arguing that production is “testimonial” or that the documents requested are privileged that, constitute legitimate grounds for objecting to a request for production? If so, what are the short term and long term consequences, if any, of objecting to a CID on the basis of the Fifth Amendment?

Counsel for the client receiving a CID must cautiously examine these questions before agreeing to respond to any request for production pursuant to a CID.

Furthermore, another important consideration is, under what circumstances, should the client consider filing a petition to set aside the CID on the basis of the Fifth Amendment and/or how should the client respond if the government moves to enforce the CID? See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733(j)(3) (A) (permits a CID recipient to petition to set aside or modify any portions of the demand requiring production). Two recent cases involving petitions to enforce CIDs shed some light on strategies for responding to motions to enforce a CID and the validity of certain objections to requests for production.

In United States v. Aria Sabit, No. 14-MC-50155 (E.D. Mich. April 1, 2014), for example, the district court addressed the limitations of broad CID requests for email communications. Dr. Sabit was a physician investor in a company called Apex which supplied medical implants manufactured by Reliance to hospitals. After Dr. Sabit’s investment in Apex, his use of Reliance implants at various hospitals increased dramatically. The government alleged that Dr. Sabit received $30,000.00 a month based on his investment in Apex. To this end, the government requested that Dr. Sabit produce documents concerning payments Reliance made to Dr. Sabit and, more significantly, “documents concerning communications or meetings between you and Reliance, or between you and any actual or potential Reliance investor.” United States v. Aria Sabit, No. 14-MC-50155 at *4 (E.D. Mich. April 1, 2014). Dr. Sabit refused to produce the requested email communications with Reliance emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment shields him from any obligation to produce those documents. The district court agreed reasoning that the request was a “fishing expedition” much like the one found to be testimonial in United States v. Hubbell. Id. at *6, citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 41-43 (2000). In so holding, the court found that an act of production of documents is testimonial where it is “akin to answering interrogatories or responding to a series of questions at a discovery deposition where the witness ‘make[s] extensive use of his own mind’ in identifying the documents requested” by the government. Id. at *5, citing United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 41-43. Significantly, the court also reinforced that “Dr. Sabit would be required to sift through all of his emails to respond to the document request” and that “such an exercise would require Dr. Sabit to use the contents of his mind” which is identical to answering written interrogatories or questions during a discovery deposition. Id. at *5-6.

Similarly, in United States v. Aurora Health Care, No. 14-MC-77 (E.D. Wisc. March 20, 2015),the district court focused on, to what extent, a peer review privilege may establish a basis for refusing to produce documents. Aurora sought to withhold volumes of documents claiming that they were protected by Wisconsin’s peer review privilege which is codified by statute. While the district court noted that all states recognize some form of peer-review privilege, federal courts reject the peer-review privilege as a privilege recognized by federal common law. United States v. Aurora Health Care, No. 14-MC-77 at *2 (E.D. Wisc. March 20, 2015). According to the district court, the investigation, which did not relate to a malpractice lawsuit, would also be “hindered by blocking access to peer review materials which could shed light on whether Aurora was submitting false claims to the government.” Id. at *2-3.

Thus, Sabit demonstrates the narrow grounds for refusing to produce documents in response to a CID or for setting aside portions of a CID whereas Aurora, while an innovative approach to the CID enforcement, underscores the importance courts ascribe to these investigations even when they gobble up documents or communications purportedly protected by the peer review privilege.

TIPS

Based on the above risks, any decision to appear for oral testimony, produce documents, or respond to interrogatories should be carefully evaluated. Below are some suggested tips for softening the initial impact of receiving any CID.

Informal Meeting

While the CID statute proscribes three distinct methods by which the government may obtain information, there is no harm in requesting an informal meeting with the AUSA in lieu of oral testimony nor is there any prohibition against an informal meeting. Such a request might be rejected but it should be made as early as practicable and should spell out the reasons why the client’s attendance at an informal meeting with the AUSA might serve as an adequate substitute for oral testimony.

At a meeting, the client may also be in a position to produce documents which are directly responsive to the “primary areas of inquiry” set forth in the CID. Likewise, counsel for the client may be in a better position to glean additional facts and learn more about the direction of the investigation based on the questions at the informal meeting.

Narrow the Scope

Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 governing subpoenas and/or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 governing relevance are the operative provisions limiting CID requests for production, responses to interrogatories, and oral testimony, the civil investigative demand provision and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are “intended to encourage careful behavior when alleging fraudulent conduct.” United States v. Kernan Hospital, Civil Action No. RDB- 11-2961 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2012). Notably, a CID is intended to be used responsibly “only in those instances where it is absolutely necessary to determine whether a fraud action under the [False Claims Act] is appropriate.” Id.

Thus, at the outset, counsel should reach out to the AUSA and establish a proper understanding of precisely what questions will be asked and/or what class of documents the government seeks to obtain. There should be no surprises during any oral examination concerning the areas of inquiry, and even if there are, one easily overlooked benefit of oral testimony, unlike a deposition but akin to grand jury testimony, is that the client may confer with counsel “in confidence” prior to answering any question on the record. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733(h)(7)(A). Notwithstanding this important benefit, an objection should be entered in the record based on the government’s failure to toe the line.

Invoking the Fifth

There are two primary methods a client may use to invoke the Fifth Amendment in response to CID: (1) objecting to a request for production because it requests testimonial communications protected by the Fifth Amendment; or (2) objecting to an individual question during an oral examination under oath. Where possible, counsel should avoid the second scenario by engaging in preliminary discussions with the AUSA to determine the nature of the questions the client should anticipate. That way, if the AUSA veers off the agreed upon line of questioning, an invocation of the Fifth Amendment might not be necessary. Instead, counsel may simply object to the questions because they are beyond the scope of the “primary areas of concern.”

Counsel should also be wary of the potential pitfalls of invoking the Fifth, e.g. the possibility of the government or another party requesting an adverse inference instruction, as a response to a request for production or during an oral examination. Yet, if a criminal investigation is underway, or the corporation is in a cooperative posture with the government in an effort to root out and disclose the alleged misconduct committed by the client, the client may be required to formally invoke the Fifth Amendment. Alternatively, if a client’s status as a subject or a target is unknown or undefined, counsel may ask the AUSA to delay any oral examination until counsel can conclusively determine if there is an ongoing criminal investigation involving the client. In short, invoking the Fifth Amendment — regardless of whether the client must assert it formally or may assert it informally by agreeing with the AUSA that oral testimony is unnecessary — is in the client’s best interest when there is any reason to believe that a criminal investigation is percolating, even if the government decides to request an adverse inference later on.

Petition to Set Aside a CID

Counsel might petition to set aside the CID if the CID is deficient. Petitions to set aside a CID, however, pose two significant hurdles for the client. First, any petition will immediately become part of a public court record unless the client successfully moves for a court order or moves to file the petition under seal to avoid the potential negative publicity associated with the petition. Second, as shown in Sabit and Aurora, the grounds for objecting to enforcement of a CID are narrow. Barring unusual circumstances, like the case of United States v. Kernan Hospital, Civil Action No. RDB- 11-2961 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2012) during which the government served CIDs on defendant hospital a second time after unsealing the qui tam complaint, a CID recipient’s valid grounds for setting aside a CID or portions of the CID may be limited to reliance on an applicable privilege, assertion of the Fifth Amendment to avoid production of testimonial communications, or attacking the completeness or particularity of the requests for production or interrogatories. See 31 U.S.C. Section 3733(j)(3)(B).

CONCLUSION

Given that the government will continue to vigorously investigate allegations of False Claims Act violations and is not adequately equipped to sufficiently evaluate hundreds of qui tam filings simultaneously (even with the assistance of the Criminal Division), counsel should continue to expect a surge in CIDs and should properly advise the client with respect to the risks of responding (or not responding) to a CID. In so doing, as reinforced in this Article, it may be in the client’s best interests to engage in informal, preliminary discussions or negotiations to establish the guidelines that should govern the requests for production or oral examination. Taking this middle-ground approach might allow the client to avoid some of the negative consequences of implementing a strategy geared towards absolute silence or a strategy where the client alienates the government by lodging objections, filing petitions, and generally, being non-responsive.

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How to Fight An Extradition Request

Mr. Feldman is an extradition defense attorney with experience representing individuals in extradition proceedings. An extradition defense attorney can assist persons detained in the United States on a provisional arrest warrant. Below is a summary of what one might expect in an international extradition proceeding.

Definition of Extradition. Extradition is the formal surrender of a person by a Country to another Country for the purposes of prosecution or punishment.[i]

Issues Decided at Extradition Hearing. At a minimum, courts generally must decide the following issues before issuing a certification of extraditability:

  • Is there an extradition treaty?
  • Is the person in custody the person being sought?
  • Has the defendant been charged with an offense that falls within the treaty?
  • Is there dual criminality?
  • Is there probable cause to believe that a crime was committed based on a careful review of the documentary evidence submitted by the requesting country?

Extradition Treaty

  • The starting point for the entire extradition analysis is the applicable extradition treaty.

Extraditable Offense

  • The offense for which extradition is requested pursuant to the extradition treaty must be an “extraditable offense,” including a conspiracy or an attempt to commit an “extraditable offense.”
  • An extradition treaty generally contains a provision or article outlining the categories of extraditable offenses.

Dual Criminality

  • A Crime in Both Countries. While the treaty itself may proscribe certain “extraditable offenses,” the requesting country must show that the extraditable offense is a crime in the requesting country and the requested country.[ii] Without making this showing, the requesting country has not demonstrated what is commonly referred to as “dual criminality.” [iii]
  • Relaxed Requirements. Importantly, some extradition treaties may relax or eliminate the requirement of complete parity between the offense in the requested country and the offense in the requesting country. [iv] For example, although many federal offenses involving economic crimes require the government to prove a jurisdictional nexus, g., that an act affected interstate commerce, in some cases, the requesting country may satisfy its dual criminality requirement without making such a showing.
  • Tax and Customs. Treaties may also contain special provisions which govern when the offense alleged in the request is a violation of a law relating to taxation, customs, or duties.

Required Supporting Documentation

  • Required Documents. A request must generally include the following documents:
    • A summary of facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case.
    • The text of laws describing offense for which extradition is requested and the applicable penalty;
    • The arrest warrant;
    • The charging document; and
    • Any other documents or information that further support the detention of the requested person.
  • Requesting Country’s Submission Must Include Specific Documents. The requesting country must also submit specific, required documents with the request, according to the treaty.
  • Admissible and Authenticated. The above-described documents must also be admissible and properly authenticated pursuant to either the treaty’s admissibility provisions (if the treaty contains one) or pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3190 which permits the requesting country to admit the documents submitted with the request as long as they are accompanied by a “certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the U.S. resident in the requesting country.”[vi]

Probable Cause

  • Probable Cause Requirement. Assuming that the requesting country faithfully follows the provisions in the treaty, the magistrate is still required to find that there is probable cause to believe the offense alleged in the request was committed.[vii]
  • Probable Cause. Probable cause is generally defined as “evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief in the accused’s guilt.”[viii]
  • Probable Cause Hearing. The probable cause hearing is akin to a preliminary hearing. The purpose of the hearing is not to determine whether the accused is guilty or innocent. At the hearing, the rules of evidence and of criminal procedure also do not apply.

Explanatory Evidence

  • Courts may Consider Explanatory Evidence. In deciding probable cause, courts may consider explanatory evidence. [ix]
  • Explanatory Evidence. Explanatory evidence is “[e]vidence explaining away or completely rebutting the existence of probable cause” opposed to evidence which “merely controverts the government’s probable cause evidence.”[x]
    1. Explanatory evidence may be viewed as “evidence that provides an innocent explanation for the matters which the government contends point toward guilt” and if the “government relies upon circumstantial evidence, the accused is generally permitted to introduce evidence that helps explain it away.” [xi]
    2. Courts have also previously considered evidence of an alibi defense[xii] or a coerced confession,[xiii] or witness recantation evidence in deciding whether the requesting country demonstrated probable cause. [xiv]

Court Decisions Denying Probable Cause. Courts have previously denied probable cause under the following circumstances:

  • Poland’s extradition request was riddled with conclusory statements and unsubstantiated evidence, and “admitted lies.”[xv]
  • Testimony and statements from many different sources supporting Trinidad’s extradition request failed to demonstrate probable cause to believe relator committed conspiracy. [xvi]
  • Newly discovered evidence found by relator which was admissible “casts such serious and substantial doubt upon the validity of the allegations of the requesting country [Dominican Republic] as to now obliterate probable cause.”[xvii]
  • Czech Republic’s submission of unsworn affidavits to support its request in contravention of its own Treaty requirements constituted a “material deficiency.”[xviii]
  • Submissions by Germany failed to establish fraudulent intent in a bank fraud case.[xix]
  • France submitted insufficient evidence to demonstrate that defendant possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit theft by fraud in a case involving a “faith healer.”[xx]
  • Materials submitted by Switzerland, namely a Zurich Supreme Court decision, failed to establish probable cause because they failed to “set forth facts from which both the reliability of the source and probable cause can be inferred.”[xxi]
  • Bolivia’s extradition request based on charges of fraud, illegal association, and breach of trust, including a witness affidavit with “speculative” statements and the summary of the proceedings before the Bolivian judge, was insufficient to demonstrate probable cause.[xxii
  • Spain’s extradition request was not supported by probable cause when Spain used a statement that defendant recanted to support their request and there was additional evidence that defendant’s confession was elicited through coercion.[xxiii]
  • Czech Republic submitted two documents, a written statement from citizen and a photocopy of wire transfer, in support of extradition request.[xxiv]
  • Italy submitted a Florence court opinion, which referenced documents allegedly implicating relator in a drug trafficking conspiracy in support of its extradition request.[xxv]

Treaty Defenses

  • Ex Post Facto: Identify the applicable law governing the lapse of time defense, g., the law of the requesting country, the law of the requesting and requested countries, before raising that defense.
  • Affirmative Defense to Extradition. Even if the requesting country demonstrates probable cause, there are several treaty defenses, which operate as affirmative defenses to a request for extradition.
    1. Prior Prosecution: Treaties generally permit the prior prosecution defense when there was an acquittal in the requested [xxvi]
    2. Lapse of Time: This defense may be problematic depending on the nature and character of the offense.
  • Military Offense Exception
    1. The military offense exception – that the crime alleged in the request is only a crime under military law – is rarely invoked.[xxvii]
  • Political Offense Exception.
    1. Two Prong Test. Federal courts have established a two-pronged test to determine whether an offense is sufficiently political to qualify for the exception. First, the offense involved an uprising or some other” violent political disturbance” such as “war, revolution, insurrection, or rebellion.”[xxviii] A court may allow an attorney to judicially notice evidence of this first prong by referencing newspaper articles or other sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned.[xxixSecond, the person from whom extradition is requested must show that the “offense was committed “in the course of and incidental to that uprising or violent political disturbance.”[xxx]. In deciding whether the petitioner has satisfied the second prong of the exception, courts have focused on several factors including: the violent character of the victims, if any, of the offense,[xxxi] whether the methods used to commit the alleged offense were excessive, e.g., the offense did not involve torture,[xxxii] and whether the offense was closely connected to the violent political disturbance at issue.[xxxiii]
    2. Politically Motivated. A politically motivated extradition request does not entitle the defendant to invoke the political offense exception unless the treaty bars requests “made for the purpose of prosecuting of punishing the person sought on account of his political opinions.”[xxxiv] Requests for extradition based on economic crimes, for example, are generally not politically motivated and fraud is usually not committed incident to a violent uprising or civil war either. [xxxv]
    3. Burden Shifting. At the extradition hearing, if it is shown that both prongs of the political offense exception apply, then the government must rebut that showing either by introducing their own witnesses or through cross examination.[xxxvi]

If you have been arrested on a provisional arrest warrant and are being detained in the United States based on criminal charges filed in another country, an extradition defense attorney can help you.

[i] See Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 21 (Supp. 1935)

[ii] Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933) (“dual criminality exists when he offense charged in the country seeking extradition is generally recognized as criminal in both countries.”); But see Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300, 303-04 (2d. Cir. 1981) (certifying Canada’s extradition request and finding dual-criminality in the United States and Canada based on relator’s single phone call from the U.S. to a co-conspirator in Canada in furtherance of a murder for hire conspiracy).

[iii] In Republic of France v. Moghadam, 617 F. Supp. 777, 783 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (finding that France’s request failed to satisfy the dual-criminality requirement reasoning that the alleged acts of conspiracy were committed outside of the country and relator neither conspired with anyone in France nor committed any overt acts in France).

[iv] See Extradition Agreement with European Union, art. (4)(2), Feb. 1, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. 109-14 (“Early U.S. extradition treaties confined extraditable offenses to those specifically listed in the treaty itself.  Such an approach limits extradition for newly emerging forms of criminality that the United States has a strong interest in pursuing, such as antitrust, cybercrime, and environmental offenses. Modern extradition treaties, however, have developed a new approach, which is frequently referred to as the principle of ‘dual criminality.’ Dual criminality provides that a crime is extraditable if it is punishable as a crime under the criminal law of both parties to the treaty.”).

See South African Treaty, Art. 2(6), June 25, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. 106-24 (“extradition may not be refused on the ground that the law of the Requested State does not impose the same kind of tax or duty or does not contain a tax, customs duty, or exchange regulation of the same kinds as the Requesting State.”)

[vi]  18 U.S.C. Section 3190.

[vii] 18 U.S.C. Section 3184

[viii] Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defining the probable cause standard); see also Sidali v. INS, 107 F. 3d 191, 197 (3d. Cir. 1997) (same).

[ix] In Re Cervantes-Villa, No. M-02-008 — 268 F. Supp. 2d 758, 772-773 –  (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2003) (holding that Mexico did not satisfy probable cause and that evidence of petitioner’s alibi defense was admissible); see In Re Zhen-Le Ye Gon, No. 08-596-JMF  —  2010 WL 169468 — (D.D.C. Jan. 8,. 2010) (noting that the due process clause of the constitution requires that the US Government hand over exculpatory evidence in their possession that may negate probable cause that relator committed the crime(s) for which he is charged).

[x] In Re Cervantes-Villa, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 772-73; see also In Re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (district court found probable cause, but noted that, “[i]n admitting ‘explanatory evidence,’ the intention is to afford an accused person the opportunity to present reasonably clear-cut proof which would be of limited scope and have some reasonable chance of negating a showing of probable cause.”).

[xi] In Re Cervantes-Villa, at 772-73; see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 355 F.Supp. 563, ,572 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“While the process of definition is difficult in the area of ‘probable cause’ perhaps it is enough to say that what tends to obliterate probable cause may be considered but not what merely contradicts it.”) (emphasis ours)

[xii] In Re Gonzalez, 52 F. Supp. 2d. 725, 739 (W.D. La. 1999) (court was permitted to consider evidence of an alibi defense).

[xiii] Maguna-Celaya v. Haro, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev’d on other grounds (court was permitted to evaluate evidence showing that relator’s confession was coerced).

[xiv] In Re Extradition of Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462, 1464 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (court was permitted to consider evidence that the witness recanted his testimony).

[xv] United States v. Mazur, – 2007 WL 2122401 – at *27 (N.D. Ill. July 20, 2007). The district court underscored that“[t]his court is not charged with determining guilt or innocence; nor is this Court permitted to simply hand over a United States citizen on the word of a prosecutor, coupled with conclusory allegations, and unsubstantiated, unreliable evidence. The court is not merely a rubber stamp for a foreign government’s decision that probable cause exists, such that an American citizen should be held to answer criminal charges in that country. In our system of justice, each case must be decided based on the particular evidence presented therein. And, in this case, the evidence presented fell short of the mark.” Mazur, at *27.

[xvi] In Re Extradition of Joseph Ben-Dak, 2008 WL 1307816 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 2008. The Court also called the description of the scheme, from the affidavits, “vague” and “disjointed” providing no competent evidence of what the scheme actually was. Ben Dak, at *16; see also Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“the magistrate judge does appear to have been mistaken to the extent he expressed on occasion the understanding that the extradition court lacked the authority and discretion to go beyond the face of the government’s affidavits for purposes of determining credibility or reliability.”); see  Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp 1252, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (stating “magistrate should involve himself in a determination as to the reliability of the affidavits presented and not merely blindly believe such statements without regard to the underlying facts upon which the officer believed that the information was reliable.”); But see United States v. Zanazanian, 729 F. 2d 624 (9th Cir. 1984) (report summarizing unsworn witness statements was admissible and sufficiently reliable to demonstrate probable cause); United States v. Emami, 834 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1987) (hearsay statements presented by German prosecutor in affidavit were sufficient to support probable cause finding); United States v. Afanasjev, 418 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (bill of indictment submitted by Lithuanian Government was competent evidence sufficient to support finding of probable cause to extradite even though it was unsworn and contained unsworn hearsay statements by witnesses and victims).

[xvii] In Re Extradition of Schlomo Ben-Tov, 05-22201-CIV-Garber (S.D. Fla. February 22, 2006) (Garber J.) (reversing the original certificate granting extradition request reasoning that the newly discovered evidence found by relator which was admissible “casts such serious and substantial doubt upon the validity of the allegations of the requesting country as to now obliterate probable cause.”). The court further noted that the newly discovered evidence included exculpatory evidence which was not originally in the possession of relator.  Schlomo, at *18.

[xviii] In Re Platko, No. 02-MG-07980-LAB – 213 F.Supp. 2d 1229 – (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2002) (“Authentication of the documents not themselves sworn does not suffice to establish a foundation for the factual content asserted in the documents. The papers presented in support of extradition contain no affidavit, declaration, or other form of sworn statement by any person with knowledge of the underlying facts to support the charging papers, or even certifying representations contained therein were actually made as recorded here.”).

[xix] In Re Extradition of Lehming, 951 F. Supp. 2d. 505 (D. Del. 1996) (finding that the evidentiary submissions did not establish probable cause that the fugitive committed offenses related to bank fraud because submissions did not establish fraudulent intent. Lehiming, at *514-515. In support of that holding, the court reasoned “recital of sufficient underlying circumstances is essential if the magistrate is to perform his detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp.” Lehming, at 517 (other citation omitted); see also United States v. Santos, 473 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1038 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (granting bail pending appeal finding ‘special circumstances’ and also concluded that “this case is shrouded in so much uncertainty that any assessment of probability of success on the merits is simply not feasible.”); But see In Re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting Italy’s extradition request for a fugitive accused of fraudulent bankruptcy under Italian law by unlawfully taking hundreds of millions of dollars from Italian banks and falsifying books and records). Significantly, in making its determination, the court in Sindona underscored that documents supporting Italy’s request, including bank and liquidator reports detailing relator’s fraud, were the products of thorough and “obviously careful investigations,” were corroborated by other testimony and were entitled to “great weight.” Sindona, 450 F. Supp. at 688.

[xx] Petition of France for Extradition of Sauvage, 819 F.Supp. 896 (S.D. Cal. 1993). The court further noted that, under local law, representation that some of the money obtained from patients was used for charitable purposes was not false and there was no evidence to demonstrate that relator did not believe in his power to cure people or that his claims to healing people were false. Sauvage, at 903-04.

[xxi] In Re Ernst, – 1998 WL 395267 – at *9 (S. D. N. Y. July 14, 1998) (denying Switzerland’s request for extradition finding that the materials submitted by Switzerland, namely a Zurich Supreme Court decision, fail to establish probable cause and noting that “materials submitted must set forth facts from which both the reliability of the source and probable cause can be inferred.”)

[xxii] United States v Fernandez-Morris, 99 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1372 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (Garber J.) (finding that “the lack of process afforded to relators in this case is shocking to this court” and noted that the procedural notice requirements, even by Bolivian standards, were completely deficient.) Judge Garber continued and stated that “[magistrate judges] must, under Article III of the Constitution, exercise their independent judgment in a case or controversy to determine the propriety of an individual’s extradition. The executive may not foreclose the courts from exercising their responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial process.” Fernandez-Morris, at 1336, quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 111 (1964)

[xxiii] Maguna-Celaya, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1343 (“When an individual seeks to present evidence that negates all bases for probable cause, such evidence must be admitted, because if the individual can successfully show the court that all bases for charging him are unreliable, then there is no evidence to support his extradition.”).

[xxiv] United States v. Peterka, 307 F.Supp.2d 1344 (M.D. Fla. 2003)

[xxv] In Re Ribaudo, 2004 WL 213021 at * 5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 3, 2004) (“the only evidence presented in support of extraditability is the decision of the Florence Court of appeal” which references other documents (including wire-taped conversation). The court also noted that, even if it were to give “some weight” to the referenced documents in its analysis of this case, it cannot make an independent probable cause determination because those documents are not available to the Court. Ribaudo, at*6.

[xxvi] See Bolivian Extradition Treaty, Art. V. (2), Nov. 21, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. 104-22

[xxvii] In Re Ezeta, 62 F.972 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (finding that the offenses committed constituted military offenses under the Treaty).

[xxviii] Ordinola v. Hackman, 478 F.3d 588, 596-97 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that “we—like the magistrate judge and district court—have little trouble in agreeing that the alleged actions here occurred during the course of a violent political uprising,” but finding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the offense was not committed incident to the violent political uprising.)

[xxix] In Re Extradition of Suarez Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that the offense was committed during a period of intense violence in Argentina but concluding that the offense was not “incident to” the political turmoil or uprisings occurring in Argentina); see Barapind v. Enomoto, 400 F.3d 744, 753 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that “[t]here is no real doubt that the crimes Barapind is accused of committing occurred during a time of violent political disturbance in India,” but finding that the offense of murder was not committed incident to the political uprising).

[xxx] Ordinola, 478 F.3d at 596-97.

[xxxi] In Re Roberto Guillermo Bravo, No. 10-20559-MC (Nov. 2, 2010), DE-62 at 4-5 (denying Argentina’s request for extradition finding that the victims of the alleged massacre were violent, extremist terrorists)

[xxxii] In Re Ezeta, 62 F.972 (N.D. Cal. 1894)

[xxxiii] See International Extradition: United States Law and Practice, M. Cherif Bassiouni, (Fifth Ed. 2007), at p. 672 (“with the application of the political incidence test, only an attenuated connection need be shown between the common crime and the political act.”)

[xxxiv] See Jamaican Extradition Treaty, Art. III (2), July 7, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. 98-18.

[xxxv] See Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 78-79 (2d. Cir. 1960) (“we have discovered no case authorizing a federal court, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon extradition.”). However, the Second Circuit also admitted that “we confess to some disquiet at this result. We can imagine situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court’s sense of decency as to require reexamination of the principle [non inquiry] set out above.” Gallina, 278 F.2d at 79; see Jihrad v. Ferrandina, 536 F. 2d 478, 485 (2d. Cir. 1976) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the extradition request from India was “politically motivated” by “India’s desire to punish him for his outspoken advocacy of Israeli causes at a time when India’s national policy favored the Arab bloc” and finding that his “embezzlement of money” from a fund he was responsible for administering was “not in any sense a political offense” and there was a “substantial basis” for prosecuting appellant.); see Sindona, 619 F.2d at 173-74 (rejecting relator’s claim that the extradition request was “politically motivated” when the record before the magistrate judge provided a “substantial basis” for relator’s prosecution for bankruptcy fraud); see also Italy Extradition Treaty, Article V, TIAS 10837 (Sept. 24, 1984) (“Extradition shall not be granted when the offense for which extradition  is requested is a political offense, or if the person whose surrender is sought proves that the request for surrender has been made in order to try or punish him or her for a political offense.”) (emphasis ours).

[xxxvi] Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D. Fla. 1959) (“These established facts placed the burden on the demanding government to prove that the crime charged in the Complaints was not of a political character. The demanding government failed to sustain this burden.”).

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Hedge Funds and FCPA

Should Hedge Funds be Concerned with Government Enforcement of FCPA in 2014?

Three years ago, law firms and consulting firms predicted an apocalyptic future for hedge funds and private equity firms during the investigation of Allianz SE which resulted in a DOJ declination and an SEC enforcement action against Allianz. That enforcement action was premised on  improper payments to foreign officials made by Utama, a majority owned subsidiary of Allianz in Indonesia, to obtain government insurance contracts, and the recording of those payments as legitimate transaction costs in violation of the FCPA accounting provisions, Section 13(b) of the Exchange Act.

This year, however, the government has provided some guidance and has taken some steps that strongly suggest that they are sincerely committed to tackling corruption and prosecuting potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) involving hedge funds and private equity firms, especially in connection with sovereign wealth funds.

Hedge Funds

 1.      GAIM Ops Cayman

In April, government agencies warned hedge funds at GAIM Ops Cayman that enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) will be a priority for 2014. To this end, Sarah Coyne, chief of the Business and Securities Fraud Section at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York and one of the chief prosecutors responsible for the investigation and global FCPA settlement with Ralph Lauren, underscored:

Hedge funds are likely to fall into two buckets. The first would be if they are soliciting investments from a foreign official or a sovereign wealth fund or pension fund controlled by the state and we will be scrutinising any gifts, entertainment or travel afforded to those individuals to ensure they do not break the rules. The other area where hedge funds may fall foul is when they invest in a market where corruption is a way of life.

Ms. Coyne further emphasized that:

The use of a third party in a jurisdiction where corruption is widespread or the use of a consultant who has awareness about the local culture and who may be dealing with a sovereign wealth fund is an area where hedge funds are most likely to get into trouble under the FCPA.

Id.

2.      Och-Ziff Capital Management Group, LLC Hedge Fund

Ms. Coyne’s above-described statements coincided with the public disclosure made by Och-Ziff to shareholders that they are conducting an internal investigation related to allegations that the Company: (1) violated relevant anti-bribery laws by accepting an investment from the Libyan Investment Authority; (2) loaned $234 million to help finance two ventures in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act; and (3) failed to disclose that, beginning in 2011, Och-Ziff received subpoenas from the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Department of Justice in connection with these transactions.

Investigations and Litigation Involving Libyan Independent Authority (LIA)

The Department of Justice initiated a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation into private-equity and hedge fund dealings with LIA, a sovereign wealth fund, including Goldman Sachs, Credit Suisse, Societe Generale SA, and JP Morgan Chase. The investigation is focused on a group of “fixers,” or placement agents, operating in the Middle East, London, and elsewhere after the collapse of the Libyan government. After revolutionaries toppled the old Gadhafi regime, economic sanctions were lifted and Western firms jumped at the opportunity to invest in Libya. The placement agents may have acted as conduits to government leaders, providing direct access to members of the Libyan government.

The Libyan Investment Authority, which is a sovereign wealth fund (SWF) with an estimated value of 50-75 billion dollars sued Goldman Sachs in London’s High Court of Justice, Chancery Division in connection with losses it incurred by investing money with Goldman. The LIA claims that Goldman and its asset managers abused their relationship of trust by advising them to make investments that were too complex to understand.

Questions

Put simply, in FCPA land, this raises several questions about the extent to which the FCPA applies to investment firms (including hedge funds) when they engage placement agents, on an independent contractor basis, to develop relationships with officers, managers, or employees of sovereign wealth funds.

First, what is a sovereign wealth fund (SWF)?

A SWF is a state-owned investment fund composed of financial assets such as stock, bonds, real estate, or other financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets. SWF’s are essential for a country’s economic growth, however, such funds can be risky depending on how capital from those funds is invested. Generally, central banks reserves, which accumulate due to budget and trade surpluses, or revenue generated from exports such as natural resources, fund the SWF.

Two other common sovereign investment vehicles are public pension schemes, for example, Japan’s government pension fund used to finance pensions for public sector employees, and state owned enterprises, which are legal entities created by the Government to seek investments on their behalf, for example, Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae. A state owned enterprise is either wholly or partially owned by a government and is typically earmarked to participate in commercial activities. Just like SWF’s the amount of money held in these vehicles is substantial.

Second, what is the purpose of engaging a placement agent, third party consultant, client relationship manager, or “fixer” in the context of attracting foreign investment from SWF’s?  Investment firms should be capable of answering this question and should, where applicable, answer the following questions:

  • Who or what department is responsible for engaging a placement agent and/or cultivating relationships with the placement agents?
  • What is the primary purpose of engaging a placement agent?
  • Is the placement agent a registered representative governed by FINRA, or a similar, foreign regulatory body?
  • What was discussed during any preliminary conversations between the firm and placement agents?
  • After the discussion(s), what was the placement agent’s understanding of (1) what her role might be in obtaining access to investment opportunities in SWF and (2) how she might obtain access to investment opportunities in SWF?
  • Who, if anyone, is responsible for monitoring or supervising the placement agent? Is the relationship completely “hands off” once the relationship commences?
  • Who or what department is responsible for monitoring any ongoing relationships with placement agents aimed at obtaining access to managers, officers, or employees of an SWF?

Third, how are the agents compensated and how is that compensation recorded?

This issue was recently addressed in In SEC v. Tomas Alberto Clarke Bethancourt, et al, No. 13-CV-3074 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013). In that case, the SEC alleged that the emerging markets arm, located in Miami, of a New York broker-dealer, was funneling bribes to officials of a state-owned bank in Venezuela in return for transaction fees – in the form of markups and markdowns – on riskless principal trade executions in Venezuelan sovereign state bonds. Part of the scheme involved the use of a “foreign finder” located in Panama to identify investment opportunities in Venezuela.

Further, in the parallel criminal case, the Department of Justice indicted several individuals (some of whom later pled guilty), including the manager of the Miami branch, for violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.

Against this backdrop, firms might ask some of the following questions:

  • How are placement agents’ compensated, flat fee or commission?
  • Is an independent consultant retained to assess the fair market value of any fee? Do they conduct a fair market valuation to determine the reasonableness of the fee?
  • Is payment properly recorded in the firm’s books and records?
  • If so, how is any agent compensation recorded in the investment firm’s books and records? Is it recorded as a consulting fee?
  • How is payment made to the placement age, check, cash, wire transfer, etc?
  • Is payment made directly to the placement agent individually or to a company or entity designated by the placement agent to receive payment?
  • If so, how is that payment recorded in the firm’s books and records?

Finder’s Fee?

  • Is the placement agent awarded a “finder’s fee?”
  • If so, how is the finder’s fee calculated?
  • If so, does the firm confirm that the foreign finder is not required to register in the U.S. as a broker/dealer nor is subject to disqualification?
  • If so, does the firm confirm that the finder is a foreign national or entity domiciled abroad?
  • If so, does the firm confirm that the customers referred by the finder are foreign nationals or entities?
  • Does the firm disclose what compensation is to be paid to the finder to the customers/investors?
  • Does the firm provide investors/customers with a written acknowledgement of the compensation arrangement and, if so, does the firm currently maintain a copy of such acknowledgement?
  • Does the firm maintain records reflecting finder compensation?

Fourth, what is the placement agent’s role, if any, in providing the firm with access to employees, managers, or officers of the SWF? 

Additional questions the firm might ask in this context are as follows:

  • How does the firm regulate or supervise the degree of influence its placement agents may exercise in seeking to obtain pledges to invest in the fund?
  • How does the firm define “anything of value” in its Code of Conduct and/ FCPA/Anti-Corruption Compliance Policy?
  • Does the Policy narrowly circumscribe the permissible conduct of agents in this context?
  • Does the Policy narrowly circumscribe the permissible categories of “anything of value” in this context?
  • How would the firm record “anything of value,” offered to any employee, officer, or manager of an SWF in its books and records, including entertainment, travel, gifts, or equipment?

Fifth, are employee, managers, or officers, with whom the placement agents interact, officers or employees of a foreign government, or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof?

At first blush, answering this question may appear simple, but there is a significant appeal pending before the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Esquenazi, et. al which addresses this precise issue. Indeed, during oral arguments before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, one of the main questions on appeal is whether the convictions of defendants, telecommunications executives, should be reversed based on the district court’s refusal to grant defendants’ instruction regarding the definition of “foreign official,” specifically the definition of what constitutes an “instrumentality” of a foreign government.

The appellate attorney representing the Department of Justice underscored that an instrumentality is an entity through which government exercises its function and has dominion and control.

Further, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108(C.D. Cal. 2011)emphasized that there are several factors court should consider in deciding whether an entity is an instrumentality of a foreign government:

  • The entity provides a service to the citizens — indeed, in many cases to all the inhabitants — of the jurisdiction.
  • The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are appointed by, government officials.
  • The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through governmental appropriations or through revenues obtained as a result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or royalties, such as entrance fees to a national park.
  • The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions.
  • The entity is widely perceived and understood to be performing official (i.e., governmental) functions.

Thus, under current FCPA jurisprudence, an officer or employee of a SWF may very likely constitute an “instrumentality” of a foreign government. So, unless the Eleventh Circuit significantly narrows the definition of “instrumentality” in Esquenazi, that is the position that the DOJ is likely to maintain in future enforcement actions, investigations, and prosecutions related to the FCPA.

Conclusion

Given the current enforcement landscape and the government’s current investigations involving placement agents and SWF’s, hedge funds and private equity firms would be well-advised to review their internal policies and procedures addressing SWF’s and placement agents.

Keep in mind, this Note does not address the other anti-corruption laws that may apply in this context and firms seeking to attract foreign investment through the implementation of third party consultants in high risk countries should review and enhance compliance with the applicable anti-corruption laws.

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Money-2

I Received an IRS Summons

What is an IRS Summons?

Summonses may be issued either to the taxpayer, or a third party, for information necessary to the proper calculation of a taxpayer’s tax liability. Summonses can also be used to determine whether a tax return is correct, to prepare a return where none has been prepared, or to collect tax.  To obtain this information, the IRS may serve a summons directly on the subject of the investigation or any third party, for example, a bank, who may possess relevant information. In doing so, the IRS may examine books and records, including documents, financial statements, etc., and may command the person possessing the records or anyone else with information relevant to the IRS investigation, to appear before an official of the IRS.

Is an IRS Summons the First Notice I Should Have Received?

According to recent guidance from the IRS, the IRS should typically send several documents to a taxpayer prior to issuing a formal summons. Those documents might include: (1) IRS Form 4564, an Information Document Request, as an informal request to produce information and documents relevant to a determination of the taxpayer’s tax liability, prior to issuing a formal summons (2) a delinquency letter stating that the taxpayer has not yet produced the relevant documents and (3) a pre-summons letter.

If you have received any of the above-described documents or an IRS summons, it is absolutely critical that you contact an attorney. Far too frequently, taxpayers ignore the summons or they mistakenly believe they can resolve the situation themselves by producing the necessary documents and by making a convincing presentation to a seasoned IRS investigator.

What Form does the IRS Use for Summons?

The IRS uses various Forms for civil summonses, included but not limited to Forms 6637-6639 or Form 2039.  The summons may state:

You are hereby summoned and required to appear before an officer of the Internal Revenue Service, to g ive testimony and to bring with you and to produce for examination the following books, records, papers, and other data relating to the tax liability or the collection of the tax liability or for the purpose of inquiring into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws concerning the person identified above for the periods shown.

The IRS usually personally serves a summons but agents can also leave the summons with a person of suitable age and discretion. A summons may also be served on a business entity.

What Type of Summons Have I Received?

Generally, there are two types of summons, (1) a summons directly to the taxpayer(s) or (2) a third party summons requesting information relevant to a particular taxpayer.

In many cases, the IRS is required to notify the taxpayer about other persons or entities receiving the third-party summons. Two significant exceptions to this notice rule are: (1) the summons was issued in connection with a criminal investigation to a person who is not a third-party record keeper, e.g., a bank, an accountant, an attorney, a broker, an enrolled agent, an investment company, etc., (2) the summons was issued in aid of collection of an assessment made or judgment rendered against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued. In other words, there has already been a judgment or an assessment made against the taxpayer and the summons is an effort to collect monies from the taxpayer.

Can I Ignore the Summons?

Federal courts may enforce summonses and a person may be held in contempt or, in some cases, may be subject to criminal prosecution for a failure to obey a summons. Therefore, you should contact an attorney as soon as possible if you receive an IRS summons.

Can I Challenge a Summons?

A taxpayer receiving a summons may wait for the IRS to petition to enforce the summons and may then challenge the petition. However, generally, the IRS’ may show that the summons is valid and enforceable by attaching a declaration or an affidavit stating that: the summons was issued for a legitimate purpose, the information sought is relevant to that purpose, the IRS has taken all of the required administrative steps, and the IRS does not possess the information requested in the summons.

A taxpayer may also challenge a third party summons, assuming the taxpayer is entitled to notice of the summons, for several reasons. Keep in mind, however, that there are strict notice and time requirements for challenging a third party summons.

May I Hire an Attorney During This Process?

If you have received summons in connection with your personal tax liability, you would be well-advised to ensure that an attorney is present during any meeting with an IRS official. An attorney may assist you in answering the IRS official’s question and will determine when, and on what basis, you might refuse to answer the official’s questions.

If you have received a summons, in connection with someone else’s tax liability, you may be entitled to have an attorney present during any meeting with an IRS official.

Should I Produce All of the Documents Mentioned in the Summons?

With the assistance of an attorney, you may evaluate which documents are relevant and, more importantly, which documents should be produced. Assessing which documents should be produced is a complicated task that you should not attempt to accomplish without the assistance of an attorney.  Hiring an attorney may also help a tax payer avoid the possibility of unknowingly or inadvertently producing documents that are potentially incriminating or contain privileged information. Further, if you decide not to produce certain documents, then the IRS may challenge your reasons for not producing those documents. For example, even if you assert the Fifth Amendment as the basis for not producing the documents, the IRS may object based on several legal doctrines. Therefore, engaging an attorney to guide you through this process is critical.

Mr. Feldman has experience in civil and criminal tax matters and the Firm is well-positioned to assist taxpayers in this process.

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